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RESTORING THE BALANCE BETWEEN
IMMIGRATION SELF-REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
SHEENA KELLEY†
INTRODUCTION1
The small boat raced the rising sun, straining to reach shore
before losing the veil of the morning haze. The tension on board
was as palpable as the muggy August air. Thirty-five people sat
packed together on the floor of the boat, unable to move and too
afraid to try. They watched the two men piloting the boat and
anxiously awaited their signal. Finally, they were told to get
ready. The boat jerked forward as it hit ground.2 Cursing, the
captain ordered them off the boat. They scurried over the side of
the boat and ran ashore to conceal themselves in the bushes and
await the next leg of their journey. As soon as the last passenger
cleared the side, the boat sped away.

†
Senior Staff Member, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s University
School of Law; B.A., 2003, State University of New York College at Brockport. Many
thanks to my husband, Eric, for being my sounding board and constant source of
support and inspiration. I would also like to express my gratitute to the Hon.
Michael Telesca for his advice, encouragement and overall mentorship.
1
The following narration is based loosely on the facts of United States v. GarciaCordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
2
Disregard for human life and acts of violence are not uncommon in the
business of alien smuggling. See, e.g., Alien Smuggling, U.S. IMMIGR. SUPPORT,
http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/alien-smuggling.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2012). All too often, aliens are injured or killed as a result of dangerous conditions
during the journey or in an attempt to evade authorities. See, e.g., id.; Brian W.
Robinson, Smuggled Masses: The Need for a Maritime Alien Smuggling Law
Enforcement Act, ARMY LAW. at 20, 20–21, Aug. 2010, available at
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/08-2010.pdf; Amanda Lee Myers, ‘Major’
Human Smuggling Cell Busted in Arizona, USATODAY.COM (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/states/arizona/2010-11-10-2156779578_x.htm.

311

WF_Kelley (Do Not Delete)

312

12/3/2012 12:44 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:311

The journey had reached its end. Coast Guard Officers
patrolling the area heard a boat run aground and arrived in time
to see several people jump from the boat and run ashore. The
officers searched the bushes and found thirty-five people whom
they determined to be Cuban nationals. None of the Cuban
nationals had immigration documents authorizing them to enter
the United States. The boat and its two-man crew were also
apprehended nearby. Officers found a satellite phone and a GPS
on board. These devices revealed that the boat had left Pinar del
Rio, Cuba on August 12, 2008 and traveled to Loggerhead Key,
Florida, where it was apprehended on August 13, 2008.
Loggerhead Key is not a designated port of entry.3
The two men who piloted the boat were charged with
conspiracy, thirty-five counts of encouraging and inducing
aliens to enter the United States in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A)(iv), and attempting to reenter the United
States after removal.4 These men were also charged with thirtyfive counts of bringing unauthorized aliens to the United States
and failing to immediately bring and present them to an
immigration officer for inspection.5 Not only did these men
violate U.S. law by bringing undocumented Cuban nationals into
the United States, they broke the law by not reporting their own
illicit activities immediately to the government.
To facilitate information gathering, the government has
increasingly relied upon statutes that create an affirmative duty
for individuals to report information to the government.6 These
statutes allow the government to operate effectively in areas
such as immigration law, where it would be inefficient, and likely
impossible, to obtain this information through independent
However, the government’s legitimate interest in
means.7
enforcing these reporting provisions often is in tension with
individuals’ Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination.8 The Supreme Court has been called on to
3

Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1313–14.
Id. at 1313.
5
Id.
6
Jeremy H. Temkin, “Hollow Ritual[s]”: The Fifth Amendment and SelfReporting Schemes, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467, 467–68 (1986).
7
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 455 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1971) (noting
that self-reporting requirements are essential to the government’s ability to collect
income taxes).
8
Temkin, supra note 6, at 468.
4
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examine several of these reporting provisions and has recognized
the need to balance the competing interests of the government
and of private individuals.9
In the field of immigration, self-reporting statutes are used
to facilitate the screening and tracking of applicants seeking
admission to the United States.10 Violations of these statutes
traditionally result in civil consequences, such as exclusion or
deportation.11 However, federal immigration law is becoming
increasingly more criminalized12 and, as a result, self-reporting
requirements now appear in felony provisions of immigration
law.13 Notable among these is 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii),14
which is a self-reporting provision that requires anyone bringing
undocumented aliens to the United States to immediately bring
those aliens to a designated port of entry15 and present them to
an immigration officer for inspection.16 This is referred to as the
“bring and present” requirement.17
The tension between government need and Fifth
Amendment privilege created by the “bring and present”
requirement is evident.18 However, the Supreme Court has held
that not all self-reporting statutes are unconstitutional—the
privilege against self incrimination “may not be invoked to resist
9

Id.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (requiring applicants for
admission to the United States to answer questions under oath regarding their
intentions); 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006).
11
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing for the removal of applicants for
admission that are deemed inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006) (making failure
to notify the Attorney General of a change in address a misdemeanor and providing
that the alien shall be removed regardless of whether the offense is prosecuted
criminally); 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2006) (prescribing civil penalties for failure to depart
when so ordered).
12
See generally Gia E. Barboza, From the Legal Literature, 45 CRIM. L. BULL.
511 (2009).
13
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (making it a felony to not bring
and present an alien to an immigration officer upon arrival).
14
Id.
15
A port of entry is a location, designated by statute, staffed by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection personnel and used for processing individuals, agricultural
products, and merchandise being imported into the United States. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 100.4(a) (2009); Ports of Entry and User Fee Airports, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_outreach/ports.xml
(last
visited Sept. 16, 2012).
16
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).
17
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 615 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
18
Temkin, supra note 6, at 468.
10
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compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the
State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its
criminal laws.”19
To determine which reporting requirements fall within this
regulatory regime exception, the Supreme Court established a
three-factor test in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board.20 This test requires courts to evaluate whether the
reporting requirement (1) is aimed at a highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activity, (2) is asserted in an
essentially regulatory area of inquiry, and (3) creates a
substantial likelihood of prosecution.21 While this test was
adequate when established, its continued application has led to
the inequitable denial of rights due to the increasingly criminal
nature of areas of law that were traditionally regulatory, such as
immigration law.22 The need to balance regulatory reporting
provisions, such as the “bring and present” requirement, and the
privilege against compelled incrimination has been a tenuous
one—more so in light of the increasing criminalization of
regulatory law.23
This Note argues that the test currently relied on to
maintain this balance is no longer effective and must be replaced.
Part I analyzes the history of immigration law and limitations on
Fifth Amendment protections.24
Part I also examines the
legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) and its intended
use as an anti-smuggling statute.25 Part II discusses the factors
used by courts to evaluate Fifth Amendment claims and courts’
treatment of various reporting provisions.26 This Part also
discusses how these factors, as they are currently applied by the
courts, no longer adequately protect individuals’ Fifth
Amendment rights.27 Part III illustrates the inadequacies in the
current application of these factors by applying them to the
19

Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990).
See generally Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70
(1965) (laying out the three-factor test for determining which reporting
requirements fall within the exception).
21
See United States v. Adair, No. 88-1264, 1988 WL 114791 (6th Cir. Oct. 31,
1988).
22
Infra, Part II.
23
Infra, Part I.
24
Infra, Part I.
25
Infra, Part I.
26
Infra, Part II.
27
Infra, Part II.
20
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“bring and present” requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).28
Part IV suggests that the factors evaluated by courts must be
fundamentally altered to guarantee the continued protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from compelled selfincrimination.29 This Part suggests that a more effective test
would restrict the evaluation of the nature of inquiry to the
statute itself and would require courts to conduct a more
structured evaluation of the group targeted by the statute.30
I.

A.

IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Evolution of Immigration Law

Immigration law was traditionally a means of regulating the
entry and naturalization process of aliens. In the beginning, the
only intersect between criminal law and immigration law was in
the denial of entry to those with an existing criminal record.31
However, through the enactment of successive legislation, the
two areas of law have become hopelessly intertwined. This
merger between immigration law and criminal law has occurred
in three general ways: (1) through the proliferation of criminal
laws in the area of immigration, (2) harsher sentences for
immigration violations, and (3) changes in immigration
enforcement practices. The substantial changes in these three
areas have resulted in immigration law that is irreparably
intertwined with criminal law.
1.

The Proliferation of Criminal Offenses in Immigration Laws

The United States did very little to regulate immigration
through most of the 19th century.32 Initially, aliens were only
deportable if, within a year of arrival, they became a public
charge.33 The grounds for deportation were expanded in 1917 to
include any alien who, within five years of arrival, had been
28

Infra, Part III.
Infra, Part IV.
30
Infra, Part IV.
31
See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2006).
32
See Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration
Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1924–1965, 21 LAW & HIST.
REV. 69, 73 (2003); Stumpf, supra note 31 (noting that originally only those with
prior criminal histories were denied entry).
33
See Ngai, supra note 32, at 74.
29
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convicted of a felony, a crime involving moral turpitude,34 or
prostitution.35 The first steps towards the criminalization of
immigration law began in the 1920s with the enactment of
legislation that set an annual cap on the number of aliens who
would be allowed to immigrate legally.36 This legislation created
a divide between those aliens who were in the U.S. lawfully and
those who entered illegally and greatly increased the need for
deportation proceedings.37 Shortly thereafter, Congress made it a
crime for aliens to unlawfully enter the country.38
Since first criminalizing illegal entry, there has been a
steady increase in both the number of criminal offenses and the
scope of offenses covered under immigration law. Congress
passed several immigration initiatives in the late 1980s39 and the
1990s40 that allowed for deportation of aliens for an expanded list
34
“Moral turpitude” is a vague phrase which, despite over 100 years of judicial
application, has managed to evade any precise judicial or statutory definition. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Holder, 413 F. App’x 435, 437 (3d Cir. 2010) (defining moral
turpitude as conduct which is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the
accepted rules of morality”), vacated in part as moot, No. 09-3478, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2593 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Biggs, 157 F. 264, 269 (D. Colo.
1907), aff’d, 211 U.S. 507 (1909) (defining crimes involving moral turpitude as acts
which evince a “base, corrupt, and malevolent purpose”). In evaluating whether a
crime is one of moral turpitude, courts look at the “inherent nature of the offense”
rather than at the individual’s conduct. Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281,
1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 439 F.3d 1308, 1311
(11th Cir. 2006)). Some crimes generally considered to be crimes of moral turpitude
are homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, arson, embezzlement, bribery, larceny,
various sex offenses, counterfeiting, and tax evasion. What Constitutes “Crime
Involving Moral Turpitude” Within Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar
Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of
Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480, §§ 10(a)–(c), 11(a), (c)–(d), (g), 12(b)–(j), 13(a)–(b)
(2011).
35
H.R. 10384, 64th Cong. § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (1917).
36
See Ngai, supra note 32, at 76 (“The 1929 law made illegal entry a separate
criminal offense . . . . [C]onviction also made future reentry impossible.”). The
passage of these regulations coincided with the “Red Scare,” the end of World War I,
and other anti-immigrant hostilities of the 1920’s. Id. at 74–76.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 76. An alien’s first unlawful entry was punishable as a misdemeanor by
up to one year in jail; any subsequent unlawful re-entry was a felony offense
punishable by two years. Id. Conviction of these offenses also made the alien
inadmissible for subsequent legal entry. Id.
39
See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
40
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 602, 104 Stat. 4978,
5077–81 (1990); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–78 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and
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of aggravated felonies as well as drug offenses and created
criminal offenses for hiring illegal immigrants, marriage fraud,
entrepreneurship fraud, attempted improper entry, and falsely
claiming United States citizenship.41 Many of these statutes
have been applied retroactively, exposing lawful permanent
residents to deportation for crimes that may not have been
considered aggravated felonies at the time they were
committed.42 In 1986, under the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) and the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986 (“IMFA”), felony offenses were
created for marriage fraud43 and immigration-related
entrepreneurship fraud.44 These offenses, applicable to both
aliens and U.S. citizens, carry sentences of up to five years.45 In
1996, Congress created several new criminal provisions to be
included in immigration law,46 including a felony offense for highspeed flight from an immigration checkpoint.47 The body of U.S.
immigration law that was once entirely civil now includes over
twenty-five sections that expressly define criminal conduct or

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101, 110 Stat. 3009546, 3009-553 to 54 (1996).
41
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 321
(lowering required sentence for violent crimes to one year and adding rape and
sexual abuse of minor to definition of aggravated felony); Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 440(e)(1), (3), (4) (adding gambling, alien smuggling,
and passport fraud to definition of aggravated felony); Immigration Act of 1990
§§ 121, 501(a)(3), (6) (criminalizing attempted unlawful entry and entrepreneurship
fraud and adding laundering, crimes of violence punishable by term of at least five
years, and certain foreign convictions to definition of aggravated felony);
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101 (criminalizing knowingly
employing an alien who is unauthorized to work); Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2, 100 Stat. 3537, 3537–38 (1986)
(criminalizing marriage fraud); see also Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries
Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 81, 84–85 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Blurring the Boundaries].
42
Amy Langenfeld, Comment, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of
Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1048–49 (1999).
43
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 § 2.
44
8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)–(d) (2006).
45
Id.
46
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act §§ 203,
211–18, 307, 324, 333–334. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) included provisions creating four new criminal offenses
in immigration law and increasing the penalties for a number of pre-existing
criminal offenses. Id. §§ 108, 203, 211–18, 307, 324, 333–334.
47
Id. § 108 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 758 (2006)).

WF_Kelley (Do Not Delete)

318

12/3/2012 12:44 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:311

relate to criminal activity.48 This expanding intersection between
criminal law and immigration law is reflected in the increased
number of aliens deported and the number of criminal aliens
removed from the country annually.49
2.

Increased Penalties for Immigration Violations

As the number of criminal immigration laws has increased
so has the severity of penalties imposed for immigration
violations.
Prior to 1924, when unlawful entry was first
criminalized, immigration violations were only punished civilly.50
With the criminalization of unlawful entry, a first offense became
a misdemeanor, which carried a sentence of up to one year in
prison.51 Subsequent unlawful re-entry was a felony offense
punishable by up to two years in prison.52 Immigrants were also
subjected to deportation if they committed a crime shortly after
arriving in the United States.53 In the past few decades, the
severity of criminal penalties imposed for immigration violations
has increased drastically.54
48
Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the
New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 619 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship
& Severity].
49
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 91
tbl.33 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf. “Criminal aliens” are those who have
previously been convicted of a crime. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48,
at 632. As the number of deportable crimes increases, the number of criminal aliens
removed will increase as well. Id.
50
Stumpf, supra note 31, at 384.
51
Ngai, supra note 32, at 76.
52
Id.
53
Immigration Act of 1917, H.R. 10384, 64th Cong. § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 899
(1917).
54
The severity of civil penalties imposed for immigration violations has also
increased as a result of recent immigration reform acts. The five-year limitation on
deportability for crimes involving moral turpitude, instituted by the Immigration
Reform Act of 1917, was removed—making an alien deportable for a crime involving
moral turpitude committed at any point after his admission to the United States.
Compare Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996), with H.R. 10384
§ 19. While not directly criminalizing any behavior, this allows for the aliens who
have committed a wide range of crimes to be punished criminally and subsequently
deported. See Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 41, at 83–84. This act
further increased the number of deportable aliens by allowing deportation as long as
the requisite crime may have been punished by one year imprisonment, even if the
actual sentence given was less. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 633.
Prior to this amendment, an alien must have actually received a sentence of a year
or longer. See id. Congress has also allowed for the imposition of steep civil fines to
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The push towards increased criminal penalties for
immigration violations began in the 1980s with a general
national shift towards increased criminal sanctions.55 The 1986
IRCA expanded the use of criminal penalties in immigration law,
subjecting employers of aliens without work authorization to
fines and incarceration.56 Changes to the offense of unlawful
entry at an “improper time or place,” also enacted at this time,
made an initial violation a misdemeanor and allowed for felony
sanctions for a subsequent “commission.”57 Amendments made to
this statute in 1990 also criminalized attempted unlawful entry,
which was previously not punishable under the statute.58 These
amendments allowed an alien to be prosecuted as a felon even
without a prior conviction for the offense.59
Congress continued this trend of increasing criminal
penalties with the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), provisions
of which increased the penalties associated with roughly a dozen
separate offenses.60 One such provision increased criminal
penalties for alien smuggling and allowed for the application of
penalties on a per alien basis instead of per transaction.61
Congress also requested that the U.S. Sentencing Commission
amend existing guidelines pertaining to alien smuggling offenses
to increase the base level for the offense by “at least 3 offense
be imposed, in addition to any criminal penalties, for illegal entry or failure to
depart. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§§ 105, 334. While not criminal themselves, the imposition of these civil penalties
creates financial hardships, furthers immigration disabilities for the alien, and is
often imposed in addition to any criminal penalties. See generally Barboza, supra
note 12.
55
Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 628–29. During the 1980s the
nation was also shifting into gear with its war on drugs and implementing stiff
criminal penalties, like three-strikes laws. Id. at 627 n.83, 629.
56
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, § 101, 100
Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)); Miller, Citizenship &
Severity, supra note 48, at 630.
57
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
58
See United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1993).
59
See United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1982)
(prosecution provided evidence of defendant’s prior conduct in violation of § 1325(a),
which did not result in conviction; the Ninth Circuit did not impose felony sentence
based on rule of lenity).
60
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, §§ 203, 211–18, 307, 324, 333–334, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-566 to 67,
3009-569 to 74, 3009-612 to 14, 3009-629, 3009-634 to 35 (1996).
61
Id. § 203.
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levels,” “increase the sentencing enhancement by at least 50
percent,” and impose provisions for various sentence
enhancement conditions.62
The increased reliance on criminal penalties in the
enforcement of immigration law has significantly blurred the line
between criminal offenses and traditionally civil immigration
offenses. Immigration offenses that were once penalized by civil
deportation or other civil penalties are now categorized as
misdemeanor and felony offenses, which can earn the violator
several years in prison.63 Criminal penalties for immigration
related offenses have, for some offenses, doubled.64
These
increasingly criminal penalties, coupled with increased
enforcement, have resulted in the incarceration of an
unprecedented number of aliens.65
3.

Evolving Immigration Enforcement Practices

The changing role of immigration enforcement in the United
States has also contributed significantly to the increased
criminality in immigration law. Enforcement of immigration
laws was virtually non-existent until the creation of the United
States Border Patrol in 1924.66 The creation of this “enforcement
mechanism[] spurred a dramatic increase in the number of
deportations,” but enforcement remained civil in nature and
severely constrained by limited financial resources.67 Those
awaiting deportation were frequently granted relief from
detention, allowing them to remain with their families and in
their community throughout the duration of the proceedings.68
Judicial review of deportation proceedings was broad, and judges
had the authority to grant relief to those facing deportation in
the form of a discretionary waiver.69
The approach to
enforcement continued to remain lax until encountering drastic
reforms in the 1980s.70
62

Id. § 203(e)(2).
See Stumpf, supra note 31, at 371.
64
See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
§ 203(e)(2).
65
Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 641.
66
See Ngai, supra note 32, at 76; Stumpf, supra note 31, at 384.
67
Ngai, supra note 32, at 76.
68
Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 622–23.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 623–24.
63
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The immigration reforms that began to take effect in the
1980s, and which increased the number and severity of
immigration offenses, were accompanied by an increase in
immigration enforcement. To give effect to the employment
restrictions it created, IRCA called for increased appropriations
for enforcement activities and worksite inspections.71 This act
also called for increases in inspection and enforcement activities
by the Border Patrol, and called for a fifty percent increase in
Border Patrol personnel.72
In 1996, Congress increased
immigration enforcement efforts again with IIRIRA provisions
that increased the number of Border Patrol agents by at least
1,000 agents per year for the subsequent five years.73
Recent legislation has done more than expand the ranks of
immigration officers; it has expanded the authority of these
officers as well. Immigration officers have the general authority
to make arrests for any “offense against the United States”
occurring in their presence or for any felony under United States
law.74 In performance of their duties, immigration officers
function in a manner virtually indistinguishable from law
enforcement officers. They carry firearms, execute warrants,75
conduct vehicle stops,76 and operate checkpoints.77 In some
respects, these immigration officers have broader enforcement
authority than law enforcement officers. Immigration officers,
unlike state law enforcement officers, have the statutory
authority to board and search trains, aircraft, and vehicles for
unauthorized aliens within “a reasonable distance” from the
border without first obtaining a warrant.78 Immigration officers
may even patrol private lands within twenty-five miles of the
border for the purpose of preventing aliens from illegally entering

71

Id. at 630.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 111(b)(2),
100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (1986).
73
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-553 (1996).
74
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(5) (2006). Border Patrol agents have the general authority
to make arrests for any “offense against the United States” occurring in their
presence or for any felony under United States law. Id.
75
Id.
76
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
77
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 574 (1976).
78
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3).
72
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the United States.79 Recently, the authority of immigration
officers has been extended, granting them the authority to
enforce federal drug laws and customs laws.80
This increased manpower and enforcement authority of
federal immigration officers has been supplemented by the
increasing authority of state law enforcement officers to perform
the functions of an immigration officer.81 The extent of state law
enforcement officers’ authority to enforce federal laws has long
been a point of contention.82 It has traditionally been held that
the authority of state law enforcement officers was restricted to
enforcing immigration laws that were criminal.83 Attorney
General John Ashcroft issued an opinion in 2002 that
contradicted this widely held belief, stating that states had the
inherent authority to enforce both criminal and civil federal
immigration laws.84 Moreover, the Attorney General may now
enter into agreements with state agencies which allow properly
trained state law enforcement officers to carry out immigration
functions while acting under color of federal authority.85
Certification by the Attorney General allows the state officer to
79

Id. Border Patrol agents may also conduct warrantless searches of
individuals, and their personal effects, who are deemed to be applicants for
admission for evidence which may lead to their exclusion from the United States. Id.
§ 1357(c).
80
See Enforcement Initiatives Against Drug Smuggling in Southern California:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt. & Intergovernmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 2–3 (2001) (statement of
William T. Veal, Chief Patrol Agent, San Diego Border Patrol Sector, INS), available
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/testtrg.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., BORDER PATROL DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES
ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, REPORT NO. I-98-20 (September 1998), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e9820/. Border Patrol Agents are crossdesignated to enforce these laws under 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (2006) and
21 U.S.C.A. § 878(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
81
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
82
See LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2009).
83
See id. at 4. Some states expressly authorize state law enforcement officers to
enforce federal criminal laws while others see it as within their inherent powers. Id.
84
Id. at 7 (quoting John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002)); see also Kris W. Kobach,
The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 182 (2005) (stating that the inherent
authority of state and local law enforcement to make arrests for criminal violations
of the INA has “long been widely recognized” but that confusion exists relating to
arrest authority under the INA’s civil provisions).
85
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
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perform “function[s] of an immigration officer in relation to the
investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United
States (including the transportation of such aliens across State
lines to detention centers).”86
Efforts to increase the efficacy of immigration enforcement
snowballed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.87
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated forty agencies,
including the Border Patrol and several others dealing with
immigration enforcement, under the umbrella of the Department
of Homeland Security.88 New federal agencies have also joined in
the enforcement of immigration laws. Formed in 2003, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) joined the efforts
of Border Patrol in enforcing, among other things, immigration
laws.89
Under new regulations established since September 11,
2001, there has been a heightened application of both new and
pre-existing immigration laws. These regulations call for the
fingerprinting of all illegal or criminal aliens apprehended
nationwide.90 Furthermore, procedures were implemented to
strengthen and enforce the application of the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”), which required all
aliens remaining in the United States for more than thirty days
to register and be fingerprinted.91 Procedures were put in place
for the enforcement of NSEERS requirements, which were

86

Id. § 1357(g)(1).
See, e.g., SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 82; Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra
note 48, at 644.
88
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
89
Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
about/overview/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (“ICE’s primary mission is to promote
homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of
federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.”). In
carrying out its mission, ICE agents have been given the authority to enforce over
400 federal statutes. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED
STATES
MANILA,
PHILIPPINES,
http://manila.usembassy.gov/usagencies2/u.s.-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2012).
90
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 112, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-559 (1996).
91
John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Announcing the National Security
Entrance and Exit Registration System (June 5, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/natlsecentryexittrackingsys.htm.
87
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regularly waived by agency regulations prior to the September 11
attacks, with regard to aliens deemed to be a high risk or a
national security threat.92
The increased authority of immigration enforcement officers
and enhanced enforcement strategies being implemented in the
recent attempt to curb the flow of illegal immigrants into the
United States and secure the nation’s borders has resulted in the
rapid evolution of immigration enforcement.
Immigration
officers no longer enforce purely civil laws but a myriad of
criminal laws as well.93 Their enforcement activities mirror those
performed by law enforcement agencies and their authority often
overlaps that of law enforcement agencies.94
The current
enforcement practices of an immigration officer differ little from
those of a state or local law enforcement officer who can enforce
criminal drug laws and make a mental health arrest.95
Immigration enforcement is no longer the distinct,
predominantly civil, regulatory system that it traditionally was.
Criminal statutes and stiff criminal sanctions have now
comprehensively reshaped immigration law. The overlapping
enforcement authority of federal immigration officers and state
law enforcement officers has eliminated any appreciable
distinction between civil immigration laws and criminal
immigration laws.96
This increasing criminalization of
immigration law merits the extension of Fifth Amendment
protections to immigration law, at least for criminal statutes like
8 U S.C. § 1324.

92

Id.
See Stumpf, supra note 31, at 371.
94
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006) (detailing the powers of federal immigration
officers and employees).
95
See id. § 1357(a)(5) (authorizing federal immigration officers to, in the course
of their duties, make arrests for the violation of any laws of the United States).
96
See id.
93
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The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that no individual “shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”97 This protection
has been found to apply “in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, in which
the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or
discoverable as a result of his testimony, could be used in a
subsequent state or federal criminal proceeding.”98 However, this
protection against providing potentially incriminating testimony
is not without limitations. The Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination does not justify making false
statements or withholding required business records and
documents and cannot be claimed on behalf of a corporation.99 In
some situations, Congress may require potentially incriminating
information to be reported to the government without violating
the privilege against self-incrimination.100
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this Fifth
Amendment privilege “may not be invoked to resist compliance
with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public
purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.”101
The constitutional safeguards provided by the Fifth Amendment
may be limited with regard to statutory self-reporting
regulations in areas of inquiry deemed to be regulatory. In
assessing the constitutionality of a self-reporting statute, courts
look at: (1) if it was directed at a highly selective group
97

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672 (1998) (quoting Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
compelled production of objects has been found to be sufficiently testimonial to
trigger the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination where the
demanded object “might be used as evidence in or at least supply investigatory leads
to a criminal prosecution.” Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S.
70, 78 (1965).
99
See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
100
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 616 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
101
Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990)
(emphasis added).
98
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inherently suspect of criminal activities, (2) if it was asserted in
an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, and
(3) if compliance would create a substantial likelihood of
prosecution.102
Under this evaluation, self-reporting statutes found to
violate the Fifth Amendment right to be free from selfincrimination were in areas of inquiry “permeated with criminal
statutes”103 and where the divulgence would “prove a significant
‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish . . . guilt.”104 For
example, in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the
Supreme Court set aside an administrative order that required
members of the Communist Party of the United States to register
as such because this admission could be used to prosecute them
under various laws.105
The Court found that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was rightfully
asserted because the statute was directed at only Communist
Party members rather than the public at large and because the
inquiries were in an inherently criminal area.106
Similarly, in Marchetti v. United States, the Supreme Court
set aside the petitioner’s conviction for failure to register and pay
occupational taxes on his gambling business in violation of
federal wagering tax statutes.107 In reaching this decision, the
Court found that the statute targeted a group inherently suspect
of criminal activity, gambling, and that “every portion of [the]
requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence of
incriminating petitioner.”108 Furthermore, in Leary v. United
States, the Court afforded protection against self-incrimination to
a defendant convicted under a similar statute which required
marijuana dealers to register and pay a transfer tax.109 The
102

United States v. Adair, No. 88-1264, 1988 WL 114791, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 31,

1988).
103

Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79.
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969) (reversing conviction under
Marijuana Tax Act); see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 6061 (1968)
(struck down statute criminalizing willful failure to pay occupational tax on
wagering); Albertson, 382 U.S. at 81 (setting aside administrative order compelling
individuals to admit membership in the Communist Party of the United States as
admission could be used for prosecution under various statutes).
105
Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79–80.
106
Id. at 79.
107
Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 41.
108
Id. at 49.
109
Leary, 395 U.S. at 1415.
104

WF_Kelley (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/3/2012 12:44 PM

RESTORING THE BALANCE

327

Court found that the statute “compelled [the] petitioner to expose
himself to a ‘real and appreciable’ risk of self-incrimination”110
and “would surely prove a significant ‘link in a chain’ of evidence
tending to establish his guilt.”111
Alternatively, self-reporting statutes that have been found
not to violate individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights tend to be in
areas that are mostly regulatory, where the statute itself is
aimed at a broad range of individuals, and where compliance is
not likely to result in prosecution.112 For example, in California
v. Byers, a challenge was raised as to the constitutionality of a
California “hit and run” statute that required any driver involved
in an automobile accident to “stop at the scene and give his name
and address.”113
The Supreme Court held that the mere
possibility of incrimination created by this compelled disclosure
did not conflict with the Fifth Amendment because most persons
involved in accidents are not subject to criminal prosecution.114
Furthermore, the Court found that the statute in question was
aimed at the public as a whole and was part of the essentially
regulatory California Vehicle Code.115
2.

The Albertson Test Has Been Inconsistently Applied

While the three-factor assessment in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Boardexamining the size of the group, the
regulatory nature of the law, and the likelihood of
prosecutionappears to lay out a structured framework for
courts to assess self-reporting statutes, in fact, courts have wide
latitude in applying the test. This has resulted in inconsistent
interpretations.

110

Id. at 16.
Id. (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48).
112
See United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying
application of Fifth Amendment and affirming conviction for failure to report export
of currency as required under Bank Security Act); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d
708, 728 (2d Cir. 1978) (denying application of Fifth Amendment and affirming
conviction for defrauding company shareholders by inflating reported company
earnings and withholding material information regarding sale of stocks); Garner v.
United States, 501 F.2d 228, 234 (9th Cir. 1972) (denying application of Fifth
Amendment and affirming conviction for failure to report source of income on federal
income tax return).
113
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971).
114
Id. at 431.
115
Id. at 430.
111
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In applying the Albertson factors, courts have little guidance
in determining how broadly or narrowly to frame the target
group affected by the law. For example, in United States v.
Flores, the Ninth Circuit assessed a statute requiring certain
individuals shipping firearms to notify the air carrier of their
presence and found that it was inconsistent with the Fifth
Amendment protections against self-incrimination.116
In
reaching this decision, the court noted that the statute in
question was directed only at firearms dealers who were
themselves unlicensed or shipping to unlicensed individuals.117
That same statute was found to be constitutional by the Fourth
Circuit, in United States v. Wilson.118 While acknowledging that
there were more rigorous reporting requirements for persons
delivering weapons illegally, the Fourth Circuit found that this
statute was not directed at a highly selective group but at all
passengers.119
Similarly, when assessing whether the area of inquiry is
non-criminal and regulatory, courts may choose to focus on either
the specific statute or the general area of law. In Byers, the
Court focused primarily on the specific hit-and-run statute in
question, noting that “[a]lthough the California Vehicle Code
defines some criminal offenses, the statute [was] essentially
regulatory, not criminal.”120
The Court took the opposite
approach in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v.
Bouknight when called upon to assess the validity of a contempt
order issued by a juvenile court when a mother, being
investigated for the murder of her child, failed to produce the
same child before the court as ordered.121 In determining that
the order fell within the regulatory regime exception, the Court

116
United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 59596 (9th Cir. 1983) (assessing the
reporting requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)), vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985).
117
Id. at 596 (quoting Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968))
(“Because any dealing in firearms by an unlicensed person is illegal,
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), and because any shipment to an unlicensed person is also
illegal, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2), the statute is directed at ‘a highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activities.’ ”).
118
United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 97374 (4th Cir. 1983).
119
Id. (“[A]ll passengers on a common carrier are required by
[18 U.S.C.] § 922(e) to give some form of notice if they possess firearms.”).
120
Byers, 402 U.S. at 430.
121
493 U.S. 549, 55253 (1990).
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noted that the order was enforced as “part of a broadly directed,
noncriminal regulatory regime governing children cared for
pursuant to custodial orders.”122
The final factor assessed by courts, whether compliance
would create a substantial likelihood of prosecution, has also
been applied with some degree of variation. The Court in
Marchetti placed great emphasis on this factor, noting that “[t]he
central standard for the privilege’s application has been whether
the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’ and not
merely [t]rifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.”123 In
holding that the federal wagering tax statute in question violated
the protection against self-incrimination, the Court found that
registrants could reasonably expect compliance to “significantly
enhance the likelihood of their prosecution . . . [and] provide
evidence which will facilitate their convictions.”124 While the
Court in Marchetti found that a mere trifling risk of
incrimination was not enough to invoke the protection, they
noted that the rule must be flexible enough to ensure that the
constitutional privilege was not easily evaded.125 However, the
Court took a more restrictive view of this factor in both Byer and
Bouknight, and denied the Fifth Amendment protection where
the reporting requirement did not “focu[s] almost exclusively on
conduct which was criminal.”126 Unlike Marchetti, these two
cases suggest that only reporting requirements that demand
“disclosure of inherently illegal activity” will be found to violate
the constitutional privilege.127
The inconsistent interpretation and application of these
factors has left courts with little clarity on how to apply these
factors when determining whether a statute falls within this
“regulatory regime” exception to the Fifth Amendment. Under
the current formula, a court could determine that “every statute
not naming the persons or organizations to whom it applies is
directed at the public at large.”128 Similarly, “[v]irtually any civil
122

Id. at 559.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (quoting Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951)).
124
Id. at 54.
125
Id.
126
Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 454 (1971)).
127
Byers, 402 U.S. at 431.
128
Id. at 470 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123
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regulatory scheme could be characterized as essentially
noncriminal by looking narrowly . . . to the avowed noncriminal
purpose of the regulations.”129 This inconsistency has left lower
courts with little guidance on which approach they should take in
any given case and has resulted in the inconsistent application of
the Fifth Amendment.130 The increasing number of criminal
statutes in regulatory areas of law, like immigration, has created
an urgent need to remedy the unpredictability of the Albertson
test and establish a more consistent rule which will protect the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
II. ALBERTSON HAS LED TO THE ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Recently, in the United States v. Garcia-Cordero,131 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an immigration law
requiring all those transporting undocumented aliens into the
United States to immediately bring the aliens to U.S.
immigration officials did not violate the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination.132 The court found that the
statute at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), did not violate the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right because the law fell within
the regulatory regime exception.133 In making this decision, the
court applied the test laid out in Albertson by assessing whether
the statute: (1) was directed at a group inherently suspect of
criminal activities; (2) was asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry; and (3) would create a
substantial likelihood of prosecution were one to comply with
it.134 This Section will first discuss the “bring and present”
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) and its legislative
history. Second, it will discuss how the regulatory regime test
was applied to this statute in Garcia-Cordero.

129

Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Compare United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1983),
vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985), with United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967,
973 (4th Cir. 1983).
131
610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
132
Id. at 618–19.
133
Id.
134
See id. at 617.
130
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The History and Application of the “Bring and Present”
Requirement

An analysis of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) at the statute
level would necessarily lead the court to conclude that it violates
the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. There are five
separate smuggling offenses criminalized by § 1324(a).135 Section
1324(a)(2) was added to the statute in 1986 in response to the
Mariel Boatlift crisis of 1980, the mass exodus of some 125,000
Cuban aliens to Florida—many of whom were criminals.136 This
statute provides criminal sanctions for:
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that an alien has not received prior official authorization to
come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or
attempts to bring to the United States in any manner
whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which
may later be taken with respect to such alien . . . .137

This offense is similar to the alien smuggling offense
chargeable under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i),138 which was in
effect prior to the Mariel Boatlift crisis. However, this provision
extends to smuggling attempts at designated ports of entry as
well.139 Section 1324(a)(2) also has a slightly relaxed knowledge

135

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006).
Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (1982); Miller, Citizenship & Severity,
supra note 48, at 627–28. It is rumored that many of the Cubans who arrived as part
of the Mariel Boatlift were inmates and mental patients sent at Castro’s behest.
Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 628.
137
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
138
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(i) provides criminal penalties for:
(1)(A) Any person who-(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring to the
United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than
a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the
Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has received prior official
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States and
regardless of any future official action which may be taken with respect to
such alien . . . .
To prove this offense, it must be established that the defendant had actual
knowledge that the person brought to the U.S. was an alien. United States v. Aslam,
936 F.2d 751, 754–55 (2d Cir. 1991). Some courts have taken a stricter
interpretation of this statute and required the prosecutor to establish that the
defendant had acted with the intent to commit a crime. See United States v. Nguyen,
73 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 1995).
139
The alien smuggling offense in existence at the time of the Mariel Boatlift
was found not to apply to the individuals who transported the Cubans to the United
States via boat as they lacked the intent to commit a crime and they did not bring
136
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element, as the prosecutor may prove reckless disregard for the
alien’s status instead of actual knowledge.140 Under § 1324(a)(2),
the defendant need not have any surreptitious intent, only a
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien did not receive prior
approval to come to the United States.141
Subsection B of § 1324(a)(2) provides for “sentence
enhancements” in various circumstances,142 which are treated as
additional elements of the offense to be proven.143 The third of
these provisions, which was at issue in Garcia-Cordero, provides
that in the case of:
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival
immediately brought and presented to an appropriate
immigration officer at a designated port of entry,
[the defendant shall] be fined under Title 18 and shall be
imprisoned, in the case of a first or second violation of
subparagraph (B)(iii), not more than 10 years . . . .144

The addition of this element creates an offense different in
nature than the smuggling offense under § 1324(a)(2); it adds an
intent to evade inspection. This provision also includes a selfreporting requirement. In order to avoid charges, and up to ten
years in prison, under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), the individual
transporting unauthorized aliens must immediately bring and
present them to an immigration officer for inspection.145
In enacting this statute, Congress intended to extend the
reach of the existing anti-alien smuggling statutes by
criminalizing the mere act of bringing undocumented aliens to
the United States; even if those aliens were brought to a

the aliens to the country in a surreptitious manner intended to evade inspection.
See, e.g., United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 300 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
140
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
141
Id. § 1324(a)(2).
142
Id. § 1324(a)(2)(B).
143
See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 258 (1999). The Supreme Court
found, in analyzing a different statute, that “a fact is an element of an offense rather
than a sentencing consideration, [when those] elements must be charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 232. The Court held that where a sentence enhancement included facts
that could be in dispute it would be a denial of due process to treat them as
sentencing factors. Id. at 241–42.
144
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).
145
See id.
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designated port of entry for inspection.146 This statute increased
the range of criminal conduct chargeable as alien smuggling and
eliminated the general criminal intent requirement that courts
had read into the previously existing statute.147 The criminal
nature of this statute is also evident in that Congress made
violations of this statute a felony, punishable by up to ten years
in prison.
B.

The Application of the Albertson Test to United States v.
Garcia-Cordero

Garcia-Cordero moved to dismiss the charges against him for
failure to present the aliens to an immigration officer, under
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), claiming they violated his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.148
GarciaCordero claimed that, “This presentment requirement imposes
an affirmative duty on an accused smuggler to come forward
(immediately) and provide the government with evidence that
will be used against him to prove the smuggling charges.”149 This
motion to dismiss was denied and Garcia-Cordero was
subsequently tried and convicted on all counts.150 Following trial,
Garcia-Cordero’s constitutional challenge was renewed and
addressed by the district court.
Analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) in light of the factors
set forth in Albertson, the district court determined that the
“bring and present” requirement did not offend the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination as it fell within
the regulatory regime exception. The court first noted that the
“bring and present requirement is part of an extensive scheme of
statutes and regulations through which the government exercises
its control over the nation’s borders.”151 The court determined,
after
evaluating
other
immigration
statutes,
that
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) imposed no additional requirements on

146

See United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010)
(Korman, J., concurring) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 20 (1986)), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
147
Id. at 618 (majority opinion).
148
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2009),
aff’d, 610 F.3d 613.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1319.
151
Id. at 1317.
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individuals who were in violation of § 1324(a)(2).152 Because of
this, the court viewed the reporting requirement as being a
“routine procedure universally employed” rather than imposed on
a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities.153 Further, the court determined that the statute in
question was “more analogous to Sullivan, Byers, and Bouknight,
where the disclosure requirements were part of civil regulatory
regimes.”154 In drawing this conclusion, the court relied upon
precedent that found immigration law to be generally regulatory
and to serve a substantial non-prosecutorial government
interest.155 Based on this analysis, the district court found that
the “bring and present” requirement, although potentially
incriminating, fell within the regulatory regime exception and
did not offend the Fifth Amendment.156
Garcia-Cordero appealed, and this determination was
reviewed de novo by the Eleventh Circuit, which also concluded
that the “bring and present” requirement fell within the
regulatory regime exception. In its brief analysis, the court
found § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) to be “part of the federal regulatory
scheme through which the government controls our national
borders” that imposes a reporting requirement on everyone

152
In reaching this determination, the court noted the requirements found in
8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006), 8 U.S.C. § 1221 (2006), and 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a) (2009). Id.
at 1317–18. Section 1321(a) makes it the duty of “every person, including the
owners, masters, officers, and agents of vessels, aircraft, transportation lines, or
international bridges” who brings aliens to the United States “to prevent the landing
of such alien in the United States at a port of entry other than as designated.”
Section 1221 requires commercial vessels transporting persons from outside the
United States to a port therein to provide a manifest listing each passenger and
crew member to immigration officers at that port. Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a) (2009)
provides that individuals applying for entry into the United States must do so in
person at a designated port of entry.
153
Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
154
Id. at 1318.
155
Id. at 1318–19. The court, in reaching this decision, cited to the Second
Circuit’s assertion in Rajah v. Mukasey that immigration law is generally regulatory
and that immigration crimes are “almost of a different order from that which
governs those areas where reporting requirements have been struck down.” Rajah v.
Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 442 (2d Cir. 2008). The court in Garcia-Cordero went on to
note that, as a result of the government’s non-prosecutorial national security
interest, “Fifth Amendment rights are generally diminished in the context of border
crossings.” Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (citing United States v.
McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2001)).
156
See Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
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transporting aliens into the country.157 The Eleventh Circuit
differentiated the “bring and present” requirement from the
reporting requirements in Albertson, Marchetti, Haynes, and
Leary, which were aimed at “highly selective groups.”158
Comparing Garcia-Cordero’s case to those like Byers and
Bouknight, the court noted that “the activity required to be
disclosed was not inherently illegal” and that the fact that
incrimination may result does not trigger the protection against
self-incrimination.159
As the concurring opinion of Judge Korman makes clear, the
determination of the Eleventh Circuit that this statute is
regulatory contrasts sharply with the purpose of the statute
intended by Congress.160 Judge Korman points out that “the
purpose of [§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)] was not to enforce compliance
with the presentment requirement . . . . Instead, it was intended
to deter the smuggling of aliens into the United States and to
punish those who engaged in that activity.”161 The determination
reached by the Eleventh Circuit in applying the Albertson test
and the intended purpose of the “bring and present” requirement
are irreconcilable.
III. THE ALBERTSON TEST IS INADEQUATE FOR ANALYZING
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
the Fifth Amendment privilege “may not be invoked to resist
compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the
State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its
157
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 618 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
158
Id.
159
Id. (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000)). The challenged
disclosure in Byers related to individuals involved in motor vehicle accidents; in
Bouknight, it was a court order to a mother to produce her child, believed to be dead,
before the court. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971); Balt. City Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 551 (1990).
160
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 619 (Korman, J., concurring) (concurring in
judgment without reaching the merits of the self-incrimination claim). Judge
Korman, a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York sitting
by designation, lays out in detail the history behind the current statute, as amended
in 1986, and the “concern that, [w]ithout the threat of criminal prosecution, there is
no effective way to deter potential transporters from inundating U.S. ports of entry
with undocumented aliens.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99682, pt. 1, at 66 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id. at 620.
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criminal laws,”162 the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the
“bring and present” requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)
fell within this exception is inequitable. This section argues that
the problem with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding is two-fold.
First, the Eleventh Circuit erred in its application of the current
Albertson test. Second, the Court applied an antiquated test to
assess the constitutionality of the “bring and present”
requirement. This test, established by Albertson almost half a
century ago, has proven to be outdated and too unstructured to
provide adequate and consistent protection of individuals’
constitutional rights. The “bring and present” requirement is
unconstitutional, even under Albertson, as it targets individuals
inherently suspect of criminal activity and requires disclosures
which create a substantial likelihood of prosecution.
A.

The Application of the Albertson Test in Garcia-Cordero Was
Flawed

Under the rule currently applied by the courts, the “bring
and present” requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 should not fall
under the regulatory regime exception to the Fifth Amendment
because the statute is aimed at a group inherently suspect of
criminal activity and because compliance creates a substantial
likelihood of prosecution.
1.

Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) Is Directed at a Group Inherently
Suspect of Criminal Activity

In looking at § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the statute “applies to all persons transporting
aliens to the United States—irrespective of whether those aliens
have received prior authorization, and irrespective of the
transporters’ knowledge regarding such authorization.”163 The
court came to this conclusion based on the fact that a separate
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a), requires that “every person bringing
an alien to, or providing a means for an alien to come to, the
United States prevent the alien from entering the country at any
port of entry not designated by the Attorney General or

162

Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 556.
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 618. This statement was adopted in whole from
the opinion of the district court. See United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp.
2d 1312, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613.
163
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immigration officers.”164 However, when compared to § 1321(a),
and other immigration statutes, the text of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)
appears to be directed at a much more specific group of
individuals than the court, or the text in isolation, suggests.
The language used in the two sections make the groups
targeted by the statutes strikingly different in three ways:
(1) only § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) contains a reporting requirement,
(2) § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) applies to a narrower range of people,
and (3) § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) applies specifically to individuals
transporting undocumented aliens.
First, the court erroneously suggests that § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)
“does not impose any additional requirements” beyond those
required under § 1321(a)(2).165 This is not the case. Section
1321(a)(2) establishes a duty to prevent an alien brought to the
United States from landing at any place other than a designated
port of entry.166 This statute, which is punishable by fine, makes
those transporting aliens to the United States financially liable
for their compliance with United States law.167
Section
1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) goes a step further and requires that any alien
brought to the United States must be immediately brought and
presented to immigration officers at a designated port of entry for
inspection.168 While one statute requires aliens to be brought to a
designated port of entry, the other requires the transporter to
personally deliver the alien to an immigration officer for
inspection.
Second, § 1321(a), in its entirety, makes it “the duty of every
person, including the owners, masters, officers, and agents of
vessels, aircraft, transportation lines, or international bridges or
toll roads, other than [certain] transportation lines” bringing
aliens to the United States to ensure that they do not enter
anywhere other than a designated port of entry.169 Because
statutes should generally be construed so as to avoid superfluous
language,170 the explicit mention of these specific transportation
164

Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 618.
Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
166
8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006).
167
Id.
168
Id. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).
169
Id. § 1321(a). Similar language is used in § 1323(a)(1) which proscribes
bringing “any alien who does not have a valid passport and an unexpired visa” to the
United States. Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1).
170
Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883).
165
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providers in one section must bear some meaning.
This
intentional disregard for the various transportation providers in
§ 1324(a)(2) suggests that Congress intended this statute to
apply solely to private individuals.
As it is written,
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) does not apply to the public at large but only
to those involved in the transportation of aliens to the United
States.
Third, the language in § 1324(a)(2) further restricts the
applicability of subsection (B)(iii) to individuals bringing “an
alien [who] has not received prior official authorization” to come
to the U.S.171 When compared to the unrestricted language used
in § 1321(a), which refers only to “an alien,”172 the group of
individuals targeted by the statute shrinks significantly, further
distinguishing it from generally applicable statutes such as the
hit-and-run law at issue in Byers.
At first blush, the use of the phrase “any person” in
§ 1324(a)(2) suggests that the statute is directed at the public at
large. However, when viewed in light of other immigration
statutes, the actual target group is much narrower. When read
in its entirety, the plain meaning of § 1324(a)(B)(iii) limits its
application only to individuals bringing unauthorized aliens to
the United States.173 Considering that this specific behavior is
criminalized by § 1324(a)(2),174 the reporting requirement
established by § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) necessarily applies to a group
inherently suspect of criminal activity.
2.

Compliance with § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) Creates a Substantial
Likelihood of Prosecution

In assessing whether § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) falls within the
regulatory regime exception, the Eleventh Circuit made no
assessment of whether compliance with the statute would create
a substantial likelihood of prosecution.175 The court, instead,
171

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
Id. § 1321(a).
173
See § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). Section 1321(a) proscribes similar conduct for
companies and transportation agents and provides for a monetary penalty of $3,000
per violation. 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a).
174
The act of bringing an alien who lacks “a valid passport and an unexpired
visa” (which would mean the alien lacked official authorization to come to the U.S.)
is also made unlawful, and punishable civilly by fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1).
175
See generally United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547. Likewise, the district court failed to make any analysis
172
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dismissed Garcia-Cordero’s claim that the statute in question is
analogous to other statutes determined to be invalid by
distinguishing those cases as not relating to regulatory
regimes.176 Comparing the “bring and present” requirement to
the hit-and-run statute in Byers, the court held that the privilege
does not excuse compliance with a regulatory regime. This
reasoning is completely circular and inadequate. Unlike the
statute in Byers, the “bring and present” requirement of
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) targets an activity that is inherently
illegal—alien smuggling.177
When the practical effects of
compliance with the “bring and present” requirement are
considered, it is apparent that compliance would, in the very
least, “furnish a link in the chain of evidence that would be used
to prosecute him for alien smuggling.”178 Reporting that you have
brought undocumented aliens to the country by delivering them
to an immigration officer would likely subject you to prosecution
under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A), a misdemeanor offense.179
When given the proper statutory construction, an individual
would be subject to the reporting requirement in
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) only when bringing an unauthorized alien to
the United States. In order to comply with this reporting
requirement, that individual would need to “bring” the alien to a
designated port of entry and “present” him to an immigration
officer for inspection.180 This act would be all that is required to
prosecute the individual for misdemeanor alien smuggling under
§ 1324(a)(2)(A) and would furnish evidence required for felony
prosecution under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(i) or (ii).181 The elements
required for prosecution under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) also overlap
those required under § 1324(a)(1)(A), which also pertains to alien
of the practical implications of compliance with the “bring and present” requirement.
See generally United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla.
2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613.
176
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 617. These statutes previously found to be
invalid by the Supreme Court include the required registration of marijuana dealers,
wagering activities, certain firearms, and Communist Party membership. See
generally Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
177
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
178
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 617.
179
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A).
180
See id. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).
181
See id. § 1324(a)(2).
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smuggling, as evidenced by the fact that these charges are
frequently brought simultaneously.182 A scenario in which an
individual
could
comply
with
the
requirements
of
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) without exposing himself to criminal liability
under another statute is hard to imagine. As a result, the selfreporting requirements in § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) create a
substantial, and almost certain, likelihood of prosecution.
When the reporting requirements of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) are
adequately evaluated under the test currently in use, it is clear
that it does not fall within the regulatory regime exception. Even
assuming that immigration law is generally regulatory in nature,
the reporting requirement in question is directed at a selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activity such that complying
with the requirements would furnish virtually all evidence
needed for prosecution for other offenses.
B.

The Test Established by Albertson Is No Longer Adequate

The test established by Albertson, decided forty-five years
ago, for the application of the regulatory regime exception to the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is no
longer adequate. Decades of application have revealed two major
flaws with the Albertson test. First, the test fails to account for
the criminalization of formerly regulatory areas of law. Second,
the test does not provide guidance on how to determine the
statute’s target group.
Because the Albertson test is so
fundamentally flawed, it should be replaced with a new, more
functional test, which is discussed in Part IV of this Note.
1.

Albertson Fails To Account for the Criminalization of
Regulatory Laws

The Albertson test does not account for changes in the legal
landscape since 1965, specifically the criminalization of
traditionally civil areas of law like immigration. Since the 1980s,
crime control efforts and legal policy in the United States have
taken a “tough on crime” approach that emphasizes criminal

182
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1313 (S.D.
Fla. 2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 613 (2010); United States v. Almeida, 379 F. App’x 919,
921–22 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chirino-Alvarez, 615 F.3d 1344, 1345–46
(11th Cir. 2010) (defendant charged under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), 1324(B)(ii)–
(iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2).
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penalties and enforcement.183 This approach is highlighted by
the nation’s “war on drugs,” “war on poverty,” “war on
immigration,” and the more recent “war on terror.”184 However,
this criminalization has apparently gone unnoticed by courts.
Courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, continue to treat these areas of
law as regulatory in nature and rely on precedent in applying the
“area of inquiry” factor of the Albertson test instead of
undertaking an independent analysis.185
The problem with this “area of inquiry” analysis has become
clear from the holdings in several recent cases, but is most
clearly illuminated by Garcia-Cordero. Applying the Albertson
factors to the “bring and present” requirement of
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), the Eleventh Circuit defined the
relevant area of inquiry as the entire “federal regulatory scheme
through which the government controls our national borders.”186
This is consistent with the findings of previous courts that selfreporting requirements in immigration statutes fell within the
regulatory regime exception.
These statutes, previously
examined, dealt with alien registration under the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”)187 or the
questioning of aliens by immigration officers to determine

183

Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 48, at 627.
See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 437 n.19 (2010) (discussing various domestic “wars”
engaged in by the United States in recent years).
185
For other arguments about the growth of criminal law into regulation, see
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
507 (2001).
186
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 618 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
187
Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 432–33 (2d Cir. 2008). The NSEERS
program was initiated in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to
address deficiencies in the immigration system and was designed to allow the
government to track international visitors to the United States. John Ashcroft, Att’y
Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(June
6,
2002)
[hereinafter
Remarks
on
NSEERS],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm.
The NSEERS program consisted of three components: (1) fingerprinting and
photographing at the border, (2) periodic registration of aliens from high risk
nations, and (3) exit controls informing the government of which visitors do not leave
on time. Id. Part of this program, challenged in Rajah, required “alien males from
certain designated countries who were over the age of 16 and who had not qualified
for permanent residence to appear for registration and fingerprinting and to present
immigration related documents.” Rajah, 544 F.3d at 433.
184
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admissibility to the United States.188 In deciding Garcia-Cordero,
the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s conclusion
from its evaluation of NSEERS in Rajah v. Mukasey that
immigration is generally regulatory and not criminal.189 Neither
court provides any independent analysis or reasoning to support
its conclusion regarding the nature of immigration law. At first
blush, Rajah appears to provide some guidance for evaluating the
Fifth Amendment implications of the “bring and present”
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii); however, the statutes
are dissimilar. The self-reporting requirement in NSEERS was a
condition for “the continued receipt of an immigration benefit,”
which served substantial, non-prosecutorial, government
interests.190 In contrast, the “bring and present” requirement is a
criminal offense, unrelated to the maintenance of an immigration
benefit and applicable to aliens and citizens alike, enacted to
facilitate prosecutions for alien smuggling.191 The Eleventh
Circuit’s reliance on the reasoning in Rajah is further misplaced
as the court in Rajah was assessing a reporting requirement with
strictly civil penalties—deportation.192 While the conclusion that
a statute that is punishable by deportation is “of a different
order”193 than a criminal statute is logical, it is laughable to make
the same statement with regard to § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), which is
punishable by up to ten years in prison.

188
United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 899 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Because of the
overriding power and responsibility of the sovereign to police national borders, the
[F]ifth [A]mendment guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by routine
questioning of those seeking entry to the United States.”).
189
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.2d at 618 (citing Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442). The
Eleventh Circuit again borrowed from the court in Rajah, quoting in its opinion that
while there are “some crimes related to immigration violations . . . the level of
criminal regulation in immigration matters is far less, and almost of a different
order from that which governs those areas where reporting requirements have been
struck down.” Id. (quoting Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442).
190
Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442. The court went on to note that the Fifth Amendment
also did not apply because aliens were not compelled to comply with this reporting
requirement: “Any alien who did not wish to register could avoid doing so because
the notices requiring registration applied only to those who remained in the United
States after a certain date.” Id. at 443.
191
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006); Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 620
(Korman, J., concurring).
192
Rajah, 544 F.3d at 442.
193
Id.
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Garcia-Cordero is not the first case in which this “area of
inquiry” analysis has led to questionable constitutional
determinations under Albertson. In Byers, the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of California’s hit-and-run
statute,194 finding that the statute did not violate the protection
against self incrimination as California’s interest in enforcing its
vehicle code was essentially regulatory.195 This conclusion was
contrary to the holding of the California State Supreme Court
who, in evaluating the same case, found that the defendant had
rightly invoked his Fifth Amendment protections in light of the
“widespread prevalence of criminal sanctions” regulating driver
conduct.196 The judgment of the United States Supreme Court
fails to acknowledge the “hundreds of state criminal statutes
regulating authomobiles [sic]” in its conclusion, focusing only on
the regulatory, non-prosecutorial interests of the state.197
Similarly, the Court in Bouknight found that the protection
against self-incrimination did not apply where a juvenile court
imprisoned a mother, being investigated for homicide, on civil
contempt charges for failure to produce her child before the court.
In assessing the area of inquiry, the Court emphasized that the
order to produce the child was made in the interest of the child as
part of a broad regulatory scheme.198 As noted by the dissent in
Bouknight, “[v]irtually any civil regulatory scheme could be
characterized as essentially noncriminal by looking narrowly or,
as in this case, solely to the avowed noncriminal purpose of the
regulations.”199 The Court, instead of looking at the order in
question, looked only to the purpose of the underlying civil
regime.
As seen in cases such as Garcia-Cordero, Byers, and
Bouknight, the “area of inquiry” factor used under the Albertson
test severely restricts the Fifth Amendment protection against

194
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971). The judgment in this case was
issued by a split court; Justice Harlan joined in the judgment and wrote a concurring
opinion with Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissenting. Id. at 434,
459.
195
Id. at 430.
196
Id. at 438 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah
Judicial Dist. of Mendocino Cnty., 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1046 (1969), vacated, Byers, 402
U.S. 424.
197
Byers, 402 U.S. at 460 (Black, J., dissenting).
198
Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561 (1990).
199
Id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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self-incrimination. Courts, in looking at the area of inquiry, may
determine that individuals must comply with virtually any selfreporting requirement that falls within a generally regulatory
scheme no matter how great the risk of self-incrimination.
2.

Albertson Does Not Guide Courts in Evaluating a Statute’s
Target Group

The Albertson test is flawed in that it does not appropriately
structure a court’s analysis of the group targeted by a reporting
requirement. Albertson held that a reporting requirement that
was aimed at a “highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activit[y]” was unconstitutional.200 In applying this
factor, courts have no guidance regarding the level at which they
should frame their analysis; some courts look to the target of the
specific reporting requirement while others look to the group
targeted by the general area of law. This has lead different
courts to reach different conclusions regarding the same statute,
resulting in the unequal availability of the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination.201 Depending on the level
at which courts evaluate this target group, any reporting statute
can be deemed valid.
The result of this flaw in assessing a reporting requirement’s
target group is most clearly seen in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bouknight.202 In Bouknight, the Court determined that the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination did not
shield Bouknight from complying with a court order compelling
the production of her child, as the juvenile protection scheme
governed all persons caring for children under custodial order.203
Based on this broad view of the target group—that affected by
the entire civil regime—the Court determined that it did not
target an inherently suspect group.204 The group targeted by the
juvenile protection scheme in question is more specific and
200

Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
Compare United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g
granted, 732 F.2d 1438, (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) unconstitutional because directed only at shippers
engaged in criminal conduct), with United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 973–74
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) to be a valid reporting requirement
because it applied to all passengers).
202
493 U.S. at 561.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 559.
201
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inherently suspect of criminal activity than the Court suggests.
As Justice Marshall notes in his dissent, the juvenile protection
scheme is “closely intertwined with the criminal regime
prohibiting child abuse and applies only to parents whose abuse
or neglect is serious enough to warrant state intervention.”205
However, what was being challenged in Bouknight was not the
whole juvenile protection scheme; it was compliance with a
specific court order—aimed only at Bouknight—demanding the
production of a specific child who the government suspected was
already dead.206
The cases decided under the regulatory regime test in the
forty-five years since Albertson have exposed two major flaws in
its application. First, it fails to account for the criminalization of
regulatory areas of law and, second, it does not provide guidance
on how to determine the statute’s target group. A test which is
so unstructured in its application that it leads to such
inconsistent and illogical results is an ineffective means of
protecting constitutional rights.
IV. COURTS NEED TO FUNDAMENTALLY ALTER THE
ALBERTSON TEST
The Albertson test has proven to be an inadequate means of
protecting individuals from compelled self-incrimination as it
fails to provide enough structure to be applied consistently.
Therefore, it must be refined to account for the criminalization of
regulatory areas of law. A new test must be adopted under
which courts are required to evaluate the nature of the reporting
requirement and the population directly affected by the
requirement. These factors would provide courts with a more
focused, structured basis for analyzing self-reporting
requirements and protecting individuals’ Fifth Amendment right
to be free from compelled self-incrimination.

205

Id. at 571 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 553–54 (majority opinion). The Court notes in its opinion that
Baltimore City Department of Social Services had already referred the case to police
homicide investigators and that the juvenile court judge had expressed concern that
the child, Maurice, was dead. Id. at 553.
206
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The Nature of the Reporting Requirement

Courts must assess whether the particular statute being
challenged, rather than the entire area of law, is non-criminal
and regulatory in nature. In assessing the nature of the statute,
courts should look to the legislative intent and the function
actually served by the statute as it is applied. This statute-level
analysis will allow courts to distinguish reporting requirements
in criminal statutes within regulatory regimes from those that
are truly regulatory.
Examining reporting requirements at the statute level would
preserve decisions previously reached by courts in truly
regulatory areas while protecting constitutional rights in areas
where the line between civil and criminal has become blurred.
For instance, the determination made by the Second Circuit in
Rajah would not be affected by analyzing the nature of the
statute. The registration of aliens under the NSEERS program
was required as a means of increasing the accountability of
aliens and allowing the government to identify and deport those
who overstayed their visas.207 The consequence imposed upon
the defendants—the consequence explicitly intended by
Congress—was the civil deportation of those who abused the
immigration privileges they had been granted.208
A test which focuses on the statute in question would allow
courts to make better determinations regarding statutes in
regulatory areas which are becoming increasingly criminalized.
Had the Court in Bouknight focused on the court order in
question, rather than the “broadly directed, noncriminal
regulatory regime”209 of the state child protection regulations,
they would have had to reconcile the “overlapping purposes
underlying that statute and Maryland’s criminal child abuse
statutes.”210 If the Court had evaluated the application of this
civil statute, which serves the same purpose as a related criminal
statute, under the recommended test, it probably would have
found that the application of Fifth Amendment protections was
necessary.

207
See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 2008); Remarks on
NSEERS, supra note 186.
208
See Rajah, 544 F.3d at 448.
209
Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559.
210
Id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Population Affected by the Reporting Requirement

Courts must evaluate the population affected by the
reporting requirement by looking at the text of the statute,
agency interpretations, and actual application. By looking not
only at the general text of the requirement, but beyond—to
applicable agency interpretations or the application of the
reporting requirement, courts can adequately and consistently
assess the requirement’s target.
This structured approach to analyzing the target population
would provide more consistent outcomes. The benefits of this
approach could be seen by applying it to 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), the
statute in question in both Flores211 and Wilson.212 This statute
makes it a crime for any person to ship firearms via a common
carrier, such as an airplane, to unlicensed individuals without
notifying the carrier.213 Looking at this requirement and others
in the same section—specifically § 922(f)—the Fourth Circuit
determined that the reporting requirement applied to all
passengers on the common carrier.214
In support of its
interpretation, the Fourth Circuit noted that passengers who
legally possessed weapons could turn them over to the carrier for
the duration of the flight.215 However, common carriers also have
a statutory duty not to ship weapons that would violate gun
control law and would “likely act to protect itself by notifying
authorities” of any illegal weapons they were notified of.216 While
this statute would likely still be found valid after evaluating the
211
United States v. Flores, 729 F.2d 593, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g granted,
732 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the
Ninth Circuit eventually reversed its decision in this case, it did not provide any
detailed explanation or analysis of why it changed its view of the target group.
United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499, 1500 (9th Cir. 1985). While this flip-flop
brought the Ninth Circuit in line with the rest of the courts that analyzed this
statute, its lack of explanation provides little guidance for later decisions. Id. at
1501–02.
212
United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
18 U.S.C. § 922(e) was not unconstitutional as it applied to all airline passengers,
not a group inherently suspect of criminal activity).
213
18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (2006).
214
Wilson, 721 F.2d at 973–74. The court further noted that the statute did not
require individuals to report information to the government, but to a third party. Id.
at 974. This statement appears, as noted by Flores, to merge the relevant Fifth
Amendment analysis with the analysis of a Fourth Amendment issue which should
remain separate. Flores, 729 F.2d at 598.
215
Wilson, 721 F.2d at 973 n.7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)).
216
Flores, 729 F.2d at 596.
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factors and balancing the governmental and constitutional
interests, it is important for courts to reach that conclusion based
on analysis and not conjecture.
Providing courts with a more structured framework for
analyzing the reporting requirement’s target group will also help
prevent hard cases from making bad constitutional law. With no
guidance to follow in their analysis, courts may inadvertently
mold their analysis to the desired outcome in difficult cases, like
Bouknight. Bouknight was incarcerated on contempt charges for
non-compliance with a court order to produce her son, whom the
government suspected she had killed.217 The Supreme Court
found that she was not entitled to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment because the Baltimore juvenile protection scheme
did not apply to a group inherently suspect of criminal activity.218
Requiring the Court to evaluate the target of the court order, or
even similar orders, would force it to reconcile this conclusion
with the fact that the juvenile court supervises parents suspected
of the abuse and neglect of their children.219
Under these refined factors the “bring and present”
requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) belongs within the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination. The
“bring and present” requirement creates an affirmative duty for
individuals bringing undocumented aliens into the country to
present these aliens to an immigration officer for inspection.220
The statute was enacted for the purpose of criminalizing the act
of bringing undocumented aliens to the country with this
reporting requirement intentionally targeting alien smugglers.221
Compliance with this reporting requirement would equate to
admitting all necessary elements of a misdemeanor offense
and providing evidence which could be used to prosecute or
investigate other offenses.222
An analysis of the statute’s
text suggests that it targets only individuals transporting
undocumented aliens, which is a crime.

217

Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 553 (1990).
Id. at 559.
219
Id. at 571 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006).
221
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547.
222
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)–(4).
218
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Evaluating reporting requirements using the factors
currently evaluated under Albertson has led courts to illogical
and inconsistent determinations regarding the protection against
self-incrimination.
Requiring courts to conduct a more
structured analysis focused at the statutory level would allow
them to adequately distinguish reporting requirements in
regulatory areas of law that serve criminal purposes from those
that are truly regulatory, allowing courts to maintain the
tenuous balance between governmental needs and individual
protections.
CONCLUSION
Self-reporting schemes are a necessary aspect of many areas
of government regulation and allow the government to gather
pertinent information. However, these reporting requirements
risk compelling individuals to provide the government with
incriminating information. In balancing these needs, the courts
created a regulatory regime exception to the Fifth Amendment—
prohibiting individuals from using the Fifth Amendment to
shield them from regulatory reporting requirements.
To
determine whether a reporting requirement fell within this
exception, the Supreme Court, in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, developed a test that evaluates whether
the requirement was aimed at a selective group inherently
suspect of criminal activities, asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, and if compliance
created a substantial likelihood of prosecution. This test no
longer adequately protects individuals from compelled selfincrimination. The Albertson test’s focus on the area of inquiry
fails to account for the recent criminalization of traditionally
regulatory areas of law, such as immigration law. Furthermore,
the test does not provide courts with guidance on how to evaluate
the population targeted by the reporting requirement. As a
result, the court in United States v. Garcia-Cordero mistakenly
found that the statute in question, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii),
fell within the regulatory regime exception.
To continue to maintain the balance between the
government’s need for efficient information gathering and
individuals’ protection from self-incrimination, the Court must
adopt a new standard for evaluating reporting requirements.
First, courts must assess the nature of the reporting requirement
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rather than the entire area of law. Looking to the purpose of a
statute and the function it serves will allow courts to adequately
separate criminal statutes from those that are truly regulatory in
nature. Second, courts must focus on the population affected by
the specific reporting requirement. Courts must look deeper
than the text on the face of the statute to the agency regulations
and the real world application of the requirement as well. Courts
must diligently maintain the balance between governmental
need for information and the constitutional right to be free from
self-incrimination.

